

Spanish migration policy and the Spanish economic interests abroad

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Resumen

La política española de inmigración y los intereses económicos de España en el extranjero

A partir de la década de 1990 España comienza a perfilarse como un país de inmigración, de forma que, considerando los 15 países de la Unión Europea, en el año 2008 España es el que registra un mayor número de extranjeros. La importancia creciente de España como destino de las migraciones internacionales fue utilizada por el gobierno español para diseñar una política migratoria que favoreció la internacionalización de las empresas españolas. Durante el periodo 2000-2005, la política migratoria facilitó la llegada de latinoamericanos al territorio español y, al mismo tiempo, la entrada de Inversión Extranjera Directa española en América Latina. Posteriormente, a partir del año 2006, la política migratoria se centró en la externalización del control de los flujos a través de la firma de acuerdos migratorios con diferentes países africanos que, como contrapartida, vieron incrementada la Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo española en sus países.

Palabras clave: Migraciones; Política migratoria; Inversión Extranjera Directa; Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo.

Abstract

In the 1990s Spain emerged as an immigration country, becoming in 2008 the second country with the highest number of foreigners in the 15-member European Union. The increasing importance of Spain as the destination for international migrations was used by the Spanish government to design a migration policy that favoured the internationalization of Spanish companies. During the period 2000-2005, the migration policy facilitated the entrance of Latin Americans to the Spanish territory and, simultaneously, the entrance of Spanish Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America. Subsequently, since 2006, the migration policy focused on the externalisation of the control of migration flows through the signature of migration agreements with different African countries where the Official Development Assistance was increased.

Key words: Migrations, Migrations policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Official Development Assistance

INTRODUCTION

After WWII, international migratory movements intensified, being especially noticeable as of the last decade of XX century. According to data from UN Trends in International Migrant Stock, in 1990 there were 154 million international migrants, increasing their numbers to 221 million in 2010 (United Nations, 2013). The growing importance of migratory flows has produced the interest of researchers from various fields of knowledge, publishing numerous works in which diverse aspects of international migrations are analyzed.

In the sphere of economy, works that analyze the repercussions of migrations on the recipient and ejecting economies have been published. As regards, the impact on recipient economies, most of the works underscore the positive input of migrants in the recipient economies: there are authors that conclude that migrants positively contribute to economic development (Moreno and Bruquetas, 2011; Verdugo et al., 2015), while others pit out that migrants are net contributors to State accounts (Aparicio, 2002) and others indicate that immigrants influence on the reduction of structural unemployment and on the increase of rates of female activity (Sebastián, 2006). As for their contribution to the economies in the place of origin, most of the works have focused on the repercussion of remittances on the migrants' countries, however results differ: some authors have underscored the positive impact of remittances in the recipient economies pointing out that they provide incomes and additional savings for economic development (Kapur, 2005), while other authors warn that remittances can perpetuate economic dependence and undermine the development perspectives of the recipient economies (Chami et al., 2003).

The objective of this article is to analyze for the Spanish case, an aspect not researched yet in the sphere of international migrations and economy: the relation between the Spanish migratory policy and the economic interests of Spain abroad. To do so, we structure the article as follows. In the first place, we analyze the role of southern European countries in international migrations, as migrant-ejecting countries after WWII and as recipient of immigrants as of the 1990's decade. Then we will focus on the Spanish case, analyzing the quantitative and qualitative changes experienced by alien residents as of the 1990: increase in the number of immigrants and Latin-Americanization of these migratory flows. Later, we relate this

process with the preference Spanish have for such collective v. others. To close, we link the Spanish migratory policy with the economic interests of Spanish enterprises abroad, contributing with data that disclose the Spanish government has used the migratory policy to favor the internationalization of Spanish enterprises.

SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: FROM EJECTORS TO RECIPIENTS OF MIGRANTS

After the conclusion of WWII, there is an unprecedented economic reactivation in the central and northern European countries, in such manner that from 1950-1973 the mean annual variation of GDP was 4.6 percent and per capita GDP, 3.8 percent. In this same period, in these countries the demographic transition concluded, which became a deceleration in their population's growth, which recorded a mean annual variation of 0.3 percent (Crafts and Toniolo, 1996). In this economic and demographic context, labor demand surpassed the domestic offer, so these economies were forced to hire foreign workers, which to a large extent arrived from southern European countries, fundamentally Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal (Seers, 1981), where economic growth was more moderate and demographic growth, higher.¹

From the standpoint, these migratory flows were beneficial for the ejecting and recipient countries. On the one side, in the recipient countries, economic growth rates impossible to achieve without this labor force were witnesses, additionally, such labor forces took the worst posts, which favored the labor promotion of the autochthonous. On the other side, in the ejecting countries unemployment and underemployment was alleviated and remittances were used to boost the industrialization process.²

This economic growth model enter into crisis after the 1973 oil crisis. In this new context, central and northern European countries started to record high and growing unemployment rates, which interrupted the demand of foreign labor force. Moreover, unemployment affected more severely foreigners, this way such countries started to set up return policies and

¹ Gary S. Becker, awarded with the Economics Nobel Prize linked demographic transition to the process of economic growth. According to him in the countries where the first industrial revolution concluded there was also a change in the demographic patterns of the population: reduction in fertility rates and as a result a deceleration in demographic growth (Becker, 1960).

² For instance, Gyltsos (2002) calculated the impact of remittances on income in five Mediterranean countries (Egypt, Greece, Jordan, Morocco and Portugal) and concluded that, in period of six years, investment increased at a larger proportion than the amount of the initial transference in four countries.

establish the legislation that regulated the entrance, permanence and labor of aliens (Mármora, 2002: 284-295).

Only after the mid 1980's did the European capitalist economies show signs of recovery; however, once the crisis conjuncture was overcome, no intra-European migratory flows as large as in the previous stages were noticed again. On the one side, in the central and northern European countries the economic growth rate was more moderate than that registered at the post-war stage, which negatively influenced on the demand of foreign laborers; on the other, southern countries experienced economic, political and social changes that favored the permanence of the autochthonous. In the economic sphere, the inclusion of Greece in the European Economic Community (CEE) in 1988 and the incorporation of Spain and Portugal in 1986 channeled an important amount of structural funds toward such economies, which positively influenced on their economic growth and employment creation. In the social-political sphere, the end of the Portuguese and Greek dictatorships in 1974 and the Spanish in 1975 generated expectations for the autochthonous: democratization and setting into motion a Welfare State similar to the one existing in the European capitalist countries.

Thus, by the end of the 1990's a recessive phase of the world economy begins, it will be ensued by a new growth phase as of 1995. In this new phase, the economies of southern Europe register the highest growth rates while the north, the lowest. In short, over the period 1995-2008, the Irish economy had the highest annual growth rate, 10 percent, followed by the Greek (7.6 percent) and the Spanish (6.9 percent), while the lowest was for Germany (1.9 percent).³ At the same time, the conclusion of the demographic transition in the southern European countries, with the consequential deceleration in population growth, caused that domestic employment offer was not sufficient to meet the demand, this way such countries needed to resort to the model of alien labor force, becoming the main recipients of immigrant in UE-15 (Barou, 2006). According to data from Eurostat of the European Commission, over the 1995-2008 period, the number of alien residents in UE-15 changed from 17.5 to 29.2 millions, an increase of 11.7 million, of which 8.4 million concentrated in southern European countries (Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal) (table 1).

³ The calculation of accumulative annual rates was performed from GDP data that are in Eurostat statistics (European commission).

Table 1: Number of foreigners in UE-15

	1995	2008	Increase in numbers	Increase in percentage
Germany	7 173 900	7 255 395	81 495	1.1
Austria	677 061	824 974	147 913	21.8
Belgium	909 769	971 448	61 679	6.8
Denmark	222 746	298 450	75 704	34.0
Spain	542 314	5 262 095	4 719 781	870.3
Finland	68 566	132 708	64 142	93.5
France	3 411 371	3 709 814	298 443	8.7
Greece	155 453	906 400	750 947	483.1
Ireland	114 311	559 021	444 710	389.0
Italy	729 159	3 432 651	2 703 492	370.8
Luxemburg	138 050	205 889	67 839	49.1
Netherlands	725 400	688 375	-37 025	-5.1
Portugal	168 316	446 333	278 017	165.2
United Kingdom	1 948 000	4 020 800	2 072 800	106.4
Sweden	531 797	524 488	-7 309	-1.4
Southern Europe	1 595 242	10 047 479	8 452 237	529.8
UE-15	17 516 213	29 238 841	11 722 628	66.9

Source: own elaboration from data from *Eurostat* (European commission).

In the countries in the south of Europe, the work of migrants was favored by a number of factors such as the consolidation of segmented labor markets of the relatively high weight of formal economy, elements that made the hiring of undocumented immigrants easy (López Sala, 2005). Another factor that favored the arrival of immigrants to the southern European countries was the existence of a legislation regarding aliens more permissive with entrances, permanence and hiring foreigners than the existing in central and northern Europe. This way, while European countries with migratory tradition started to build Schengen Area in 1985⁴ to restrict immigration into their territories, the scant presence of foreigners in

⁴ In 1985, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the Schengen Agreement, the inception of the Common Policy Immigration of the European Union. Its goal was to suppress the borders between the committed countries to favor the circulation of individuals within their borders and at the same time, reinforce their outer borders to restrict the entrance of extra-community foreigners.

southern European countries made these kept a lax alien law, even though this situation would change as the number of foreigners increased. Moreover, the geographic proximity of the south of Europe with the new ejecting poles (African and Western-Europe countries) and the links with the current ejecting ones (in the Spanish case with Latin America, in the case of Portugal, with Brazil and its former African colonies) accelerated the arrival of migrants.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF SPAIN AS IMMIGRATION COUNTRY

As of the second half of the 1980's and up to the current crisis, there was a growth in global economy. In the Spanish case, this growth was furthered by its incorporation to EEC in 1986. Effectively, the entrance of Spain to Communitarian Europe favored the expansion of certain agricultural cultivations, in short the Mediterranean, this way in these regions a large number of job posts were created. The characteristics of these agricultural jobs (highly seasonal, poorly paid, long and hard working hours) made the native hire in other occupations with better labor and salary conditions; this way, agricultural entrepreneurs had to resort to hire foreign workers. Hence, according to data from the Ministry of Employment and social Security, in 1999 there were 86 thousand foreigners in working actively in the Special Agrarian system, increasing their numbers up to 532 thousand in 2010 so that over this period more than 25 percent of the new jobs for foreigners were recorded in this sector.

Another economic sector favored by the incorporation of Spain to the European community was construction. After incorporating, EEC channeled an important amount of structural funds that were used, to a large extent, to build infrastructure, which increased the number of jobs in construction sector. Besides, the model of Spanish growth, as of the 1990's focused on real estate speculation, also contributed to haste the creation of job posts in this sector; many of them were taken by foreigners. In fact, according to data from the Survey on Employed Population (SEP), over the period 1996-2004, the number of people engaged in construction increased in a million to, of which 400 thousand were foreigners.

As of the mid 1990's, the deceleration in the growth of the employed Spanish population became noticeable, a consequence of the end of the demographic transition, thereby in order to develop its potential growth Spain had to resort to hire alien workers. In fact, over the 1995-2008 period, Spain was the EU-15 country that increased its foreign population the most: in 1995, there were slightly more than half a million, whereas

in 2008, this figure surpassed 5 million,⁵ making it the second country with the most alien in EU-15, only after Germany (table 1). These quantitative changes were accompanied by others, qualitative in nature. Up to 2000, Moroccans were the first alien nationality (200 thousand), surpassing the set of Latin American nationalities. However, in under a decade, Latin Americans increased their presence, this way, in 2008 they accounted for 1.3 million, while Moroccans for 700 thousand (figure 1).


This evolution is the result of Spanish government's application of a migratory that favored the entrance and employment of Latin Americans based on the existence of historical, cultural and linguistic links with the region they came from.

The application of positive discriminatory measures in favor on this collective was not contested in the context of a society that explicitly demonstrates its preference for such foreigners against others, mainly Moroccans, who up to 2000 were the most numerous nationality. Without being the only explanatory factor, rejection for Moroccans has been fueled by the media, which have disseminated a negative profile of immigration, offering images where noticeable is an immigrant profile that matches those from Morocco (Granados, 2004).

Taking into consideration the World-Systems Theory (Wallerstein, 1974), Sassen analyzes the arrival of immigrants to the United States and the role of American enterprises abroad for the period 1960-1985, concluding that internationalization has contributed to the training and directing of the migration of laborers (Sassen, 1988). As we will see over this article, as of the 1990's decade, the contingent of foreign workers in Spain has increased, distinguishing the entrance of collectives from countries where Spanish companies have taken their internationalization process, to a large extent validating the World-Systems Theory.

⁵ The 2008 crisis firstly decelerated and later decreased the entrance of immigrants: the number of foreigners reaches a peak in 2010 with almost 5.4 million, but in 2013 the figure is five million.

Figure 1: Moroccans and Latin Americans in Spain (1998-2008)



Source: own elaboration from *Anuario Estadístico de Inmigración 2008* (Ministry of Labor).

THE SPANISH PREFERENCE FOR LATIN AMERICANS

Results from various surveys carried out by the Center for Sociological Research (CSR) indicate that the Spanish prefer Latin Americans to other nationalities. In the barometer of November 2003 of CSR, the empathy and confidence the Spanish have for citizens from a number of countries.⁶ The most valued were Argentines: 73.5 percent of the respondents expressed having a lot of or much empathy for this people and 60 percent affirmed having a lot of or much confidence in them. The second most valued were Mexicans, followed by Brazilians, both with similar values to the Argentines. On the other end, the least valued were Moroccans: only 33.7 percent of the respondents stated having a lot of much empathy for them and only 26.6 percent expressed having a lot or much confidence in them.

Other data also indicate indirectly such preference. In 2008 a CSR survey asked the respondents to value the importance of different aspects that should bear in mind to permit a foreigner to come to Spain.⁷ In a scale from 0 to 10, the option “speak Spanish or the language of this Autonomous Community” was valued between nine and ten by 21 percent of the respondents and between seven and eight by 27 percent. They were also asked to value the fact that in Spanish society there are people from different countries, cultures, religions and races.⁸ In a scale from zero to ten, the worst valued aspect was the existence of various religions, in such manner that 10.6 percent valued between zero and one and 11.3 percent between two and three.

Possibly, the preference of the Spanish for Latin American relates with the existence of common historical, cultural and linguistic bonds, this way the nationals from such countries are seen as “closer” or “less alien” than other collectives. In fact, a survey produced by CSR in 2010, 72.9 percent of the respondents answered that Ibero-Americans have fewer complications that other foreigners to integrate into Spanish society.⁹ For Professor Antonio Izquierdo, the reasons for this better acceptance rest upon a number of fronts. On the one side, the reasons to come to Spain: the Spanish do not see them only as workers in need, but perceive that among them there are professionals, managers and qualified workers, this is, middle classes with which relate is easier. It is thought that many come out of affective reasons such as marriage and family ties, which increases their

⁶ CIS: Barometer November 2003 (questions 18 and 19).

⁷ CIS: Attitudes toward immigration, September - October 2008 (question 6).


⁸ CIS: Attitudes toward immigration, September - October 2008 (question 10).

⁹ CIS: Cooperation and Latin America, October 2010 (question 37).

empathy. However, maybe such preference also has the intention to nullify the dependence on Moroccan labor force in agriculture and construction, as well as dodging the cultural clash with another religion (Izquierdo *et al.*, 2002). In fact, for Spanish entrepreneurs the ideal profile of foreign workers is “young men or women, though married with children; from rural zones and from low socioeconomic strata; from certain countries of origin, considered akin to the Spanish context regarding language, religion and customs” (Sánchez-Montijano and Faúndez-García, 2011: 60).

This preference of the Spanish society for Latin Americans legitimized the Spanish government to develop measures to favor the presence of this collective, as it can be verified after analyzing the evolution of the granted work permits. As previously mentioned, in the last phase of economic growth in the Spanish economy the increase in the labor demand surpassed the domestic labor offer. Because of this, the Organic Law on Foreigners (OLF) in the year 2000 created the contingent system, this is to say, the hiring of foreigners to cover the entrepreneurial demands. In the first years, after the approval of OLF, Latin America stood out among the most benefited regions, this way out of the seven concluded agreements, three were entered with Latin American countries: Colombia, Ecuador and Dominican Republic. These initial agreements were concluded with countries with which migration was already part of the bilateral dialogue (such as Colombia) or were used precisely as a way to open such dialogue (Ecuador), but with the excuse of selection based on cultural criteria (Ferrero and López, 2009). The system hastened the arrival of Latin Americans as indicated the evolution of the number of work permits: in 1990, 40 percent of the total permits were for Moroccans and something under 30% for Latin Americans; however, as of 2002, the Moroccans only hold around 15 percent, while Latin Americans, surpassed 50% of the work permits (figure 2).

Following we will that over the last period of economic expansion, the Spanish open migratory policy was used by the Spanish government to offer the Latin American countries a generous vision of the country (Tedesco, 2010), which had a positive influence on the foreign policy with Latin America, fundamentally in the internationalization of the Spanish enterprises in the region.



SPAIN'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS ABROAD

In spite of the progressive emergence of a common immigration policy in the EU, one of the most determining dimensions (the management of access of economic immigration) remains in the hands of the member states, which design their migratory policies taking into account the interests of their foreign policy. Precisely, such relation explains that the immigration policies are highly discretionary or sometimes legitimize differenced treatments between individuals owing to their nationality.¹⁰

This way, the colonial past, cultural or linguistic affinities and geostrategic interests manifest in the elaboration of immigration policy in the EU. As it has been exposed by other researchers, the importance of Latin America in Spanish foreign affairs is rooted in historical, cultural and linguistic ties, but also in economic interests (Del Arenal, 1994).


In the second half of the 1990's decade, a new growth phase in the countries of the center of global capitalism begins. In that moment, many Latin American countries were undergoing privatization, liberalization and deregulation processes in their economies, such processes were part of the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) as a solution to the so called "debt crisis". The privatization processes intensified the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to telecommunications, electricity, prospection, exploitation and distribution of oil and derivatives, water and gas. For their part, the liberalization and deregulation measures offered a very favorable treatment to foreign investment in activities of the service sector, especially in finance.

All these elements operated as attraction factors (pull factors) for Spanish investment, just at a time when Spanish enterprises set into motion a strategy to broaden the markets by developing advantages of property and internationalization (push factors). The combination of factors of attraction and impulse is what explains the intense leave of Spanish investments toward Latin America (Arahuetes and García, 2007). This way, by the end of the 1990's decade, Spain located among the eight economies in the world by its amount of investments abroad, holding the second place in investment in Latin America, only behind the U.S. However, the situation changed in 2000, owing to the deceleration of the American Economy and the low expectations of growth in EU countries and Japan. As a result,

¹⁰ The establishment of reciprocal rights and duties via international agreements was considered a "reasonable justification" for a differenced treatment of foreigners by the Committee of Human Rights (Comunicación nº 658/1995).

there was a reduction of overseas fusions and acquisitions, therefore of the international investment flows. In 2003, a new phase of growth in the global economy begins and with it investment reactivates, but in this period the main destination of Spanish investment was the EU-15 countries (Arahetes and García, 2007). Even so, Latin America still had a crucial importance for Spanish investment. Data from Bilateral Statistics of UNCTAD show us how over the 2003-2012 period, 25 percent of the stock of Spanish investment abroad concentrated in Latin America (figure 3), with Spain remaining as the first European investor and second globally.

Figure 3: Stock de Spanish FDI IED in Latin America (% of the total)



Source: own elaboration based on data from *Bilateral Statistics* (UNCTAD).

Indeed, the expansion of Spanish enterprises in Latin America was facilitated by the historic, cultural and links, between Spain and these countries. Moreover, the Spanish government used two instruments to potentiate this expansion: bilateral agreements regarding migration and Official Aid for Development (OAD). As for bilateral agreements, we have previously seen that over the last phase of economic growth and especially in 2000-2005 period, the Spanish government favored the entrance of Latin Americans with this migratory-policy instrument. In 2001, Spain signed migratory agreements with Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Morocco. This way, over the 2000-2005 period, foreign workers in Spain increased 271 percent, while Colombians increased 976 percent and Ecua-

dorans, 951 percent. However, owing to reasons we will expose later in the text, Moroccans only increased 136 percent, far below the mean (table 2).

Table 2: evolution of the number of foreign workers in Spain by origin

	Total	Latin America	Colombia	Dominican Rep.	Ecuador	Morocco
2000	454 571	105 171	12 101	12 327	25 729	101 809
2001	607 074	177 625	26 814	13 208	67 879	124 223
2002	831 658	293 072	60 468	14 622	125 667	148 051
2003	925 280	325 764	62 869	15 873	132 956	158 328
2004	1 076 744	390 027	77 673	18 672	147 196	172 664
2005	1 688 598	690 418	130 173	25 317	270 326	239 941
Increase (no.)	1 234 027	585 247	118 072	12 990	244 597	138 132
Increase (%)	271%	556%	976%	105%	951%	136%


Source: own elaboration from data from the Ministry of Labor.

Even though over the 1993-2006 period, 86 percent of the Spanish investment flows toward Latin America concentrated in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Chile (Arahetes and García, 2007), as of the year 2000, Spanish investment becomes important in some Latin American countries, particularly in those with which Spain established bilateral agreements regarding migration, such as Ecuador, Colombia and Dominican Republic. Data from *Bilateral FDI Statistic* by UNCRAD show that in 2011, in Ecuador more than 35percent of the investment stock came from Spain, being a percentage over 30 percent in Colombia and Bolivia and over 20 percent in Argentina and Dominican Republic (figure 4¹¹).

Besides the bilateral agreements regarding migration, help to development has also fulfilled its role in favoring the expansion of Spanish investment in Latin America. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation thus indicates in *2005-2008 Directing Plan for Cooperation* when it presents the Law on International Cooperation in the suitable context to establish the relation that the policy of cooperation, foreign policy and commercial policy must maintain. More so, the Plan recognizes “the influence of commercial and geostrategic interests” in the extension and systematization of help for Latin America as of the 1980’s (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación, 2005: 16).

¹¹ To measure the importance Spanish investment has in various Latin American countries, we can resort to *Bilateral FDI Statistic* by UNCTAD, since in it the entrance and stock of investment is accounted for every country as well as the origin of such investment. Even though the statistic started in 2001, for some Latin American countries there was no information over for a number of years, this way we had to choose the year 2011.

Figure 4: % Spanish *instock* in the total *instock* of each country (year 2011)



Source: own elaboration from data from *Bilateral Statistics* (UNCTAD).


Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the Spanish help to development in Latin America intensifies just after the second half of the 1990's, a moment when Spanish investment started to unfold in the region. Data from OECD show that as of the end of the 1980's, Spanish help development was below five percent of the total of the countries of the Commission for Developmental Help (CDH), however its participation in Latin America is ten percent in the early 1990's, 15 percent in 2001 and more than 25 percent in 2008 (figure 5).

However, the attacks to the fences of Ceuta and Melilla in 2005 and the cayuco crisis in 2006 redefined the priorities of Spanish migratory policy, focusing on Africa (Pinyol, 2007) and at the same time, reorienting the priorities toward this area for the first time (Asín, 2008). After the 2006 Rabat Euro-African Dialogue for Migration and Development, the model of Agreements of Migratory Cooperation in Africa consolidated and set into motion the I Plan el África (2006-2009), which was followed by II Plan el África (2009-2012).

These plans have two sides: on the one side, cooperation and development; on the other, cooperation in migration (fundamentally border control and repatriation). These two sides are within the framework of EU mi-

gration policies based on migratory agreements that have the intention of externalizing the control of migratory flows toward origin and transit countries of migration to Europe, and very specifically with African countries. As a counterpart, the European countries committed to increase investment and help to development in the countries which signed migratory agreements (Gabrielli, 2012: 54).

Figure 5: Spanish OAD by destination region (% of CDH countries)



Source: own elaboration from data from OCDE.


As for border control, for the Spanish government these plans were a success, in such manner that if in 2006, 35 thousand clandestine people arrive by sea, in 2012, only 4 thousand did it. Well now, it is important to underscore that departures from African have not ceased, but migrants have looked for alternative routes, more dangerous, to avoid checkpoints, which has increased the number of deaths at the sea. As regards Spanish help, it increased in the countries which collaborated with border control. As of 2007, the percentage of Spanish help for development in Africa increases and as of 2011 it surpasses the percentage destined for America (figure 6).

But as in Latin America, in Africa the Spanish migratory policy was used to favor the economic interests of Spanish companies abroad. In a direct manner, I Plan África defines its economic interests in the continent. In the document, “Plan África 2006-2008. Resumen ejecutivo”, the Minister

of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation includes the seven goals of the plan, the fifth textually reads:

“The reinforcement and diversification of economic interchanges, as well as fostering of investments, without disregarding the growing strategic importance of the sub-Saharan region and in particular in the Gulf of Guinea, for our energy security and business opportunities in the oil sector for Spanish enterprises”.

Figure 6: Percentage distribution of Spanish OAD by regions (1987-2014)



Source: own elaboration from data from OCDE.

Effectively, this Plan prioritizes the creation of mixed enterprises and the participation of Spanish enterprises (such as Repsol-YPF) in the energy sector of countries such as Angola, Gabon, Guinea or Nigeria. Moreover, the Plan also prioritizes the renegotiation of agreements to fish in Namibia, Mozambique or South Africa, countries where some Spanish multinationals (such as Pescanova) already had interests regarding fishing. All these countries are incorporated into the Plan as countries of priority interest.¹²

The link between Spanish development help in Africa and the Spanish economic interests in the region also become evident when we compare

¹² Countries of priority interest that respond to a number of the stated objectives: Equatorial Guinea, Senegal, Mali and Nigeria in Central and West Africa; Angola, Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique in Southern Africa Austral; and Kenia and Ethiopia in East Africa. Mauritania is also included due to its strategical importance and condition of linking country between Maghreb and West Africa.

the priorities established in I Plan África and the business opportunities announced in the in the reports from the Economic and Commercial Spanish Office in Dakar. For instance, if in the plan the construction of infrastructure is prioritized as one of the objectives to help development, in the report the opportunity to sell construction materials owing to the large amount of public works with international funding.¹³ Within help for development, one of the instruments that has favored Spanish entrepreneurs the most are the loans from the Fund for Developmental Help. They are loans to foster development in a binding manner, as the recipient country has to return the loan buying goods and services to the donor. In theory, they have to contribute with the social and economic development of the recipient countries, and at the same time, to promote the internationalization of the Spanish economy, two objectives that some researchers have demonstrated incompatible (Arias, 2005). In fact, some authors who have analyzed the repercussion of FDH loans indicate that their application makes room for the so called “paranoia of the donor enrichment” (González and Larrú, 2004), this way, they no not fulfill their objective of contributing to the development of the recipient countries.

Despite that the Spanish government deems compatible the difference of Spain’s economic interests in Africa and the development of the continent, experiences tells us otherwise. As it has been stated in other works, Plan África is aimed at countries and sectors in function of their potential and attractiveness for Spanish entrepreneurs, however ignoring its incidence on the development of African countries (Alberdi and Bidaurratzaga, 2008: 207).¹⁴ Other works denounce that the expansion of Spanish multinationals in Africa has contributed to aggravate poverty in the continent (Romero, 2008: 162). As an indication, the overexploitation of the fishing banks in Senegal by European ships (largely Spanish) had a negative repercussion on artisanal fishing, forcing Senegalese fishermen to migrate (Verdugo and Villasante: 2012). All in all, help to development has been used as a currency to negotiate migratory control, and not as an instrument to reduce the flows acting on their causes, which poses the risk of “deviation” from the aim of development help (Gabrielli, 2012: 55).

¹³ This and other examples can be found in Romero: 2008, p.171-172.

¹⁴ This same idea appears in the document by Intermón-OXFAM entitled ‘La Realidad de la Ayuda 2006-2007’, where it is stated: “attention to commercial, investment and geostrategic criteria that Plan África incorporates may be legitimate from the standpoint of the Spanish foreign policy, but they do not necessarily help the development goals for sub-Saharan Africa” (Intermón-OXFAM, 2006: 98).

CONCLUSIONS

By the end of the 1990's a growth phase in the global economy begins. In the EU-15, the Spanish economy accomplished the best economic growth rates and employment creation. At the same time, and as a consequence of the demographic transition, the growth of the Spanish active population started to decelerate, this way the government opened the road to hire foreign workers to develop its potential economic growth.

Owing to their local proximity, up to the 1990's decade, Moroccans were the main alien collective in Spain. However, as of the year 2000, the need for labor force from abroad was covered by Latin Americans. The preference of the Spanish for Latin Americans legitimized the Spanish government to set into motion a migratory policy that favored these people. Naming historical, cultural and linguistic bonds, the Spanish government produced a generous idea of the country, but in reality it used such migratory policy to reinforce the expansion of Spanish investment in the region.

Later on, as of 2006, and using as an excuse the large flow of sub-Saharan immigrants arriving to the Spanish coasts. The other European countries as Spain, set into motion a migratory policy of border protection, which implies the collaboration of African countries to control their own borders in return for an increase of help for development. To do so, the Spanish government set into motion Plan África, which becomes an increase in help for development in those countries that carry out border control. However, far from contributing to the development of recipient countries, help for development turned into a new instrument to favor the interests of Spanish companies abroad.

Well now, the migratory policy of border externalization implies important risks. On the one side, there is the risk of flawing help for development, which should be aimed at the poorest countries and which may not agree with the countries of origin and transit of the migratory flows. On the other side, there is risk to support not democratic governments or scarcely democratic in return for controlling the border and migratory flows, something that has taken place in Tunes or Libya (Gabielli, 2012: 55).

Theoretically, foreign investment and help for development are two instruments that developed countries can use to favor the economic growth of developing countries. However, reality is utterly different. As it has been evinced in this article and in other works (Alberdi and Bidaurratzaga, 2008; Arias, 2005; Romero, 2008), the arrival of foreign investment and help for development to Southern countries has contributed to impoverish

their economies, at the same time, the revenues of the industries on the northern countries has increased.

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