

Paid housework and poverty: an analysis among Mexican states

Trabajo del hogar remunerado y pobreza: un análisis entre entidades federativas en México

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Abstract

Paid domestic work is characterized by low and unstable wages and precarious conditions that push domestic workers closer to situations of poverty. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that paid domestic work is a determinant of poverty at the state level over the period 2008-2018. Given the structure of the data, a sys-GMM dynamic panel methodology is used. The results show that paid domestic work contributes to reduce aggregate and moderate poverty, but tends to increase poverty, of an extreme nature and due to vulnerabilities. The evidence also suggests the idea of a segmented paid domestic labour market with differentiated income and working conditions. It is observed that for most entities this pattern is maintained, identifying four groups where paid domestic work acts as a mechanism that generates poverty; as an income alternative to combat it; as a way to reduce extreme poverty and vulnerabilities while increasing total and moderate poverty; and as a way to combat moderate poverty, but a generator of extreme poverty.

Keywords: Paid domestic work, poverty, extreme poverty, moderate poverty.

Resumen

El trabajo del hogar remunerado se caracteriza por ingresos salariales bajos e inestables y por condiciones precarias que acercan a las personas trabajadoras del hogar a situaciones de pobreza. El documento busca demostrar que el trabajo del hogar remunerado es determinante de la pobreza a nivel estatal durante 2008-2018. Dada la estructura de los datos se emplea una metodología de panel dinámico sys-GMM. Los resultados muestran que el trabajo del hogar remunerado contribuye a reducir la pobreza agregada y moderada, pero tiende a incrementar la pobreza, de carácter extremo y por vulnerabilidades. También sugieren la idea de un mercado de trabajo del hogar remunerado segmentado con ingresos y condiciones laborales diferenciadas. Para la mayoría de entidades este patrón se mantiene, identificándose cuatro grupos donde este trabajo actúa ya sea como mecanismo generador de pobreza; como alternativa de ingresos para combatirla; como vía para reducir la pobreza extrema y por vulnerabilidades al tiempo que aumenta la pobreza total y moderada; y como una forma de combate de la pobreza moderada pero generador de pobreza extrema.

Palabras clave: Trabajo del hogar remunerado, pobreza, pobreza extrema, pobreza moderada.

INTRODUCTION

Housework, as a form of social organization of reproductive work, is a topic that has gained interest from the political and academic approach due it constitutes the basis of the economic system. From the traditional economic approach housework is not considered as productive since it is not recognized as a generator of added value for employers, however, it is accepted as an indispensable activity for the maintenance of human life, since it provides care, education and welfare to the population (STPS, 2016).

However, in 2019 the Mexican Federal Labor Law was modified and in Chapter XIII the rights of houseworkers are recognized, as well as the obligations of employers to ensure decent working conditions. Besides, the social protection system for paid housework shows an incipient legal configuration. In particular, moving from voluntary coverage, to a pilot stage and, finally, to a mandatory incorporation scheme for houseworkers. In the first case, housework is characterized as not being assimilated to the category of salaried work, with undifferentiated contributions, full-time (single-employer), and without the regulation of a maximum working day. In the new scheme, effective as of 2023, a written labor contract and the establishment of a minimum wage for the houseworker are considered mandatory (ILO, 2016). In addition, for those who work at least 20 days per month, it incorporates other fundamental elements for social protection such as medical care, incapacity and occupational hazards, childcare, pension, housing loans, as well as coverage for the houseworkers family.

Though, a historical and structural deficit of protection persists, as it has only recently been regulated and through disjointed public measures and programs with limited resources. In particular, this situation tends to distort the options of paid houseworkers to access stable and formal income alternatives to face different social deprivations. In this regard, García (2019) establishes that in the poorest households the workload is greater when compared to other income strata, and that a third of households are consistently poor, as their income is low and they do not have additional time to devote to obtaining other labor income.

Although these legal advances pro-rights of houseworkers, in line with Bautista (2012), in practice and culturally, paid housework faces the lack of recognition as formal work, which goes against the exercise of human rights established in the laws; workers, mainly women, accept it as a means

of subsistence due to different contextual problems and because of the assigned role within the family as providers which implies time poverty.

In general, the situation of paid housework can be summarized as discrimination, due to a strong female presence, associated with horizontal labor segregation; low educational level (COPRED, 2017), with highest level of secondary education (INMUJERES, 2018); undervaluation, which articulates dynamics to perform in informality without protection of the legal framework due to lack of written contracts; economic need and lack of labor options (CONAPRED, 2014); multifaceted work (cleaning, caring, washing, ironing, cooking, etc.); high indigenous content (70 per cent of indigenous descent); lack of labor benefits (ENOE, 2019), only 37 per cent had some social benefits - medical care, pensions for sickness and maternity, and absence of unemployment, family or work accident benefits (ILO, 2016); low wages (COPRED, 2017); health repercussions such as fatigue, stress, psychological health, lack of balance between work and family life; work accidents (COPRED, 2017), among others.

This is observed in an effect of segregation of housework linked to a recognition bias with low and unstable wages generally under precarious conditions that leads houseworkers to face situations of poverty. Tokman (2010) points out that the income of houseworkers is among the lowest of all occupations, and in the case of Mexico is equivalent to around a third of the average income in urban areas, which brings them close to poverty.

This can be explained by the social perception that this work contributes with low economic value, which is associated with the arguments of Anker (1998). For Barbera *et al.* (2011), inequalities in remuneration and access to job opportunities express differences in the worker's qualifications and productive capacity, but also reflect prejudices against these groups. In this sense, Smith (2011) shows that houseworkers are exposed to risky and unhealthy conditions.

In Mexico, housework has generally been performed by women since, in the collective imagination, it is their duty to be in charge of cleaning, care among other activities. This responds to the Mexican social structure with a clear division between feminine and masculine spaces, rooting the belief that the responsibility of men is providing for the family, while the woman should dedicate to housework and raising children (Fraga, 2018).

This idea still prevails when considering paid housework, given that more than 95 per cent of paid formal and informal houseworkers are female (ENOE, 2019). In particular, it is more difficult for the poorest women to enter the labor market, since they have fewer training opportunities and

are responsible for caring for the household, minors and dependents (OAS, 2011). Therefore, their exposure and risk of falling and remaining in poverty is higher than that of men (OAS, 2011). In any case, just under 2.5 million people are paid houseworkers in Mexico in 2018, who, according to the ILO (2019), work on average 36.2 hours a week, 41.3 per cent earn between 1 and 2 minimum wages, 32.7 per cent earn less than one minimum wage, represent 4.1 per cent of the Economically Active Population (EAP) and 6.8 per cent of the salaried population. During the strongest years of the Covid 19 pandemic, between 2020 and 2022, this number of household workers fell drastically as they became unemployed, were fired without legal benefits and faced health care expenses for themselves and their families without any type of security. It is until 2023, according to the ENOE (third quarter of 2023), that they returned to the employment level of 2.5 million people engaged in paid housework, where 69.5 per cent did not receive any type of labor benefits.

Furthermore, according to ILO (2014), a significant proportion of minimum wage workers, including housework, live in poor or low-income households, and even more, in developing countries, the contribution of wages to household income is around 50 per cent. In this regard, for the majority of paid houseworkers, mainly when the head of household is a woman, this is the main income of the families, reinforcing the relationship with poverty. Thus, houseworkers are more likely than other groups of workers to live in poverty (Wolfe *et al.*, 2020). Low wage earnings in the housework sector are linked to conditions of poverty. England *et al.* (2002) point out a wage penalty in the care sector that takes the form of a gap in hourly wages of between 4 per cent and 40 per cent compared to professionals in other sectors. Furthermore, following Dromey and Hochlaf (2018), care workers, among them houseworkers, are more likely to perform in precarious jobs such as zero-hours contracts (no pay if not working), thus workers and their families are exposed to financial instabilities that affect physical, emotional and social well-being.

Thereby, there is a relationship between paid housework and poverty. Valenzuela (2009) points out that these work household work, social and gender inequalities and poverty are strongly related. The own paid housework conditions difficult to escape from a situation of poverty, perpetuating this phenomenon. In this regard, Offenhenden (2017) discusses that in this type of occupations concur low wages, seasonality, temporality, few possibilities for promotion and a very significant incidence of the informal economy, all linked to conditions of poverty. This approach complements

the idea that unpaid housework has a high incidence in poverty (Vaca, 2015).

The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that paid housework is a determinant of poverty in Mexico during the period 2008-2018. Given that state-level data is available, a dynamic panel sys-GMM methodology is employed. A macroeconomic approach is followed so that poverty variables from CONEVAL and household employment from STPSS are included, in addition to control variables associated with remittances, public spending on health and education, and productive specialization. It is hypothesized that the paid housework positively influences poverty levels. The literature tends to focus on the analysis of unpaid housework, so this paper contributes to the scarce studies at the international level and specifically for the Mexican case about paid housework-poverty.

The following section reviews the literature between paid housework and poverty. Then the data and the econometric methodology employed are described, and the results are presented and discussed. Finally, conclusions are shown.

THEORETICAL-EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND

The International Labor Organization (ILO) defines domestic work as the one performed for or within a household or several households, involving several tasks such as cleaning, cooking, washing and ironing, caring for children, the elderly or sick members of a family, gardening, housekeeping, chauffeuring or caring for domestic animals (Convention 189, ILO). Therefore, the economic and social contribution of these activities at the personal, family and organizational levels is evident.

However, housework has an impact on the socioeconomic aspects of individuals and their families who work in this market labor segment. ECLAC (2009) points out that the undervaluation of housework is reflected in a double working day for women, accompanied by an overload of work within the house and precarious labor insertion, factors that increase vulnerability to poverty and exclusion of houseworkers (ECLAC, 2009).

Therefore, houseworkers, mainly female, are exposed to falling or remaining in poverty. Rodríguez (2016) considers that a large part of houseworkers, given the type of remunerations, are poor, mainly those who have always worked in house service. He also argues that housework does not allow for social mobility, that is, it restricts the ascent from lower to higher income levels and, neither does it represent a platform for accessing better jobs with higher salaries and benefits. Considering that among the

main reasons for entering this labor segment are factors associated with poverty, such as economic need and low level of schooling (Rodríguez, 2016), all of the above seems to represent a perverse circle of poverty-houseworkers-poverty.

In particular, women -mainly the poorest- enter the labor market under conditions of inequality and lack of protection marked by underemployment, instability, lack of social security coverage and low income that characterizes housework (OAS, 2011), which seems to condemn them to conditions of poverty. For Valenzuela (2009), service in the home is the gateway to the labor market for the poorest women, with lower levels of education and who live in an environment of greater social exclusion, but practically means their only option for obtaining labor income, with little chance of finding formal employment (ICMujeres, 2013).

However, the fundamental reason for remaining in this work is the economic need of the workers, since this here is no notion of vocation (Gálvez and Todaro, 1993). In these cases, they must continue in their jobs despite low wages, poor working conditions and lousy treatment, due to the poverty experienced in their homes (Toledo, 2014). In this sense, Espinosa (2016) concludes that paid houseworkers live in conditions of material and subjective impoverishment. Cebollada (2017) states that the lack of access to health insurance and pensions implies a greater risk of falling into poverty and vulnerability during older ages.

Espinosa (2016) also states that the structural heterogeneity in the country, poverty and precariousness of paid housework is characterized by low wages, extended working hours, difficulties in recovering from fatigue, unregistered accidents, personality annulment, illnesses and physical, mental and emotional conditions. All this leads to the impoverishment of houseworkers, who, in addition, find it difficult to leave the job due to their economic, social, and sometimes emotional dependence on the employer.

At the same time, the OAS (2011) maintains that paid houseworkers face difficulties in combining their roles as providers and maintainers of household reproduction that cannot always be adequately combined, even more being women, resulting in poorer households and with a greater possibility of reproducing poverty intergenerationally. This is exacerbated by the deficit of legal and social protection that affects houseworkers; thus, they are considered as a sector subject to exploitation (ILO, 2010) and, therefore, in which different conditions of deprivation are experienced.

Exploitation is framed by the fact that people in house service tend to work all week, resting only one day, with workdays of up to 10 hours a


day, earning barely enough to purchase a basic food basket, which in many cases represents the only source of household income (ICMujeres, 2013), and which leaves them little time and energy to perform other paid activities to supplement their income.

The contextualization of the problem is even greater when considering that poverty goes beyond lack of income. For the OAS (2011) it is expressed in dimensions such as lack of opportunities, work, time, access to social networks, among others. For CONEVAL (2014), poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon, comprising several economic and social dimensions that include more than goods and services. Therefore, although performing as paid houseworker means a source of income—close to the minimum wage—it is also associated with material and immaterial deprivation. Consequently, the literature suggests a clear link between work and poverty in a broad sense.

Briefly, the relationship between poverty and paid housework can be explained within the framework of structural inequalities (see Figure 1), which involves the systematic exclusion of society groups from exercising their rights. Structural discrimination creates barriers to entry into the formal labor market, which, combined with the high supply in informal markets, underpin labor precariousness (low wages, limited access to social security, risks, uncertainties, and job instability). These factors also lead to economic burdens related to healthcare and the care of family members, particularly infants without access to daycare. Additionally, the feminization of house and care work creates a bias that primarily affects women, pushing them to perform unpaid labor. This dynamic reinforces inequality in the use of time and limits access to education and professionalization of this activity. Thus, unpaid housework leads to gaps in education and leisure time that exacerbate poverty, mainly in terms of income, health and food. At the same time, discrimination and exploitation in paid housework impact poverty levels. Consequently, paid houseworkers face a double path that leads them to remain or face poverty conditions, meaning a perverse cycle of reproduction of inequalities.

In any case, the empirical literature identifies effects of paid housework on poverty in both directions. For example, Wolfe *et al.* (2020) establish that paid houseworkers are three times more likely to live in poverty than other workers, and almost three times more likely to be above the poverty line, but not enough for the whole month (Wolfe *et al.*, 2020).

Figure 1: Structural inequalities, housework and poverty



Source: own elaboration.

In contrast, the ILO (2011) argues the existence of a positive effect of paid housework on poverty rate reduction, mainly through unemployment. It further argues that economic value increases when the wages paid in this market labor segment and the conditions under which they are performed are decent. In particular, ILO (2010) affirms that minimum wages are a central factor in reducing the poverty rates of houseworkers.

In this line, Offenhenden (2017) establishes that access to housework is understood as an improvement in the labor trajectory given the higher income and margin of autonomy for the worker when it is performed by weekly hours. On the contrary, he also states that the minimization of the risk of unemployment offered by paid housework occurs in a context where working conditions are not always improved, affecting aspects such as health and labor mobility.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Since the paper seeks to demonstrate that paid housework influences poverty at state level during 2008-2018, the data show a panel data structure. In addition, the heterogeneities in the levels of poverty and paid housework among states allow considering the existence of specific effects. Therefore, an econometric panel data model with fixed effects is proposed following

the methodology of the Generalized Method of Moments from the dynamic perspective (sys-GMM). Panel data consider the temporal behavior of heterogeneous individual units, thus increasing the degrees of freedom and allowing to control for unobserved variables (Pignataro, 2018).

The fixed effects are tested by means of auxiliary fixed effects models (FEM) and random effects models (REM) and the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test (BPLM), which poses as null hypothesis the individual specific variance equal to zero. Different tests are also used to corroborate the robustness of the standard errors, including Pesaran, Wald, Wooldridge, Modified DW, Baltagi-Wu-lbi, as well as the variance inflation factor. If the tests do not indicate that the data reflect cross-sectional dependence, heteroscedasticity, first-order autocorrelation, or multicollinearity, it is possible to use this econometric specification.

Due the possibility of model misspecification, linked mainly to autocorrelation problems, the use of dynamic panel data incorporating the lagged dependent variable is justified (Angeles & Camarillo, 2014):

$$P_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma P_{it-1} + \sum_{k=1}^n \beta_k X_{kit} + \eta_i + u_{it}$$

Where P is some indicator related to poverty; X is a vector of six explanatory or control variables in the i -th entity at time t . The inclusion of P_{it-1} implies that the regressor γ and the error term u_{it} are correlated. Heterogeneity across states is captured by the individual effects η_i .

The starting point is Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) proposed by Arellano & Bover (1995), which proposes the dynamic equation in first differences with individual effects -by state- that remain invariant over time. Formally:

$$P_{it} - P_{it-1} = \gamma(P_{it-1} - P_{it-2}) + \sum_{k=1}^n \beta_k (X_{kit} - X_{kit-1}) + (u_{it} - u_{it-1})$$

To control for the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable observed in the correlation with the error term, lagged endogenous variables are used as instruments, according to the GMM specification in first differences, framed by finite sample bias and low precision (Blundell & Bond, 1998). As an alternative, the sys-GMM significantly improves precision and reduces small sample bias (Blundell & Bond, 2000), while considering

the absence of correlation between lagged differences of the poverty indicator and state-specific effects.

Thus, the system of equations (sys-GMM) formed by the equations in first differences and in levels (Soto, 2009), incorporates a specific set of instrumental variables (Bun & Windmeijer, 2007). For the equations in levels the instruments used are the lagged differences of γ_{it} and for the equations in first difference the lagged levels of γ_{it} (Angeles & Camarillo, 2014). However, this procedure generates additional instruments that may not be valid leading the problem of over-identification of instrumental variables. Also, the different GMM specifications assume that the perturbations u_{it} are not serially correlated. It is possible that autocorrelation is present since lagged poverty (associated with persistence) is related to specific effects in each state. Therefore, it is feasible that the differenced residuals, $u_{it} - u_{it-1}$, just show first order serial correlation (Doornik *et al.*, 2002).

Therefore, three tests are applied to the sys-GMM estimator: i) Hansen test for over-identification of restrictions that determines the joint validity of the instruments; ii) difference-in-Hansen, difference between the Hansen statistic of the differenced GMM and the sys-GMM; and, iii) Arellano-Bond autocorrelation to determine the existence of first and second order autocorrelation, ensuring the consistency of the estimator if there is no grade two autocorrelation. If it is not possible to accept the null hypothesis in (i) and (ii), then it is considered that the instrumental variables are not correlated with the error term.

Given the availability of information on poverty at the state level, the years 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 with data from CONEVAL are considered. CONEVAL (2014a) proposes a poverty measurement methodology that includes income and social deprivation. In this regard, seven indicators are used relative to the percentage of population in this situation, that is, poverty (*pps*), moderate poverty (*pmpps*), extreme poverty (*pepps*), vulnerability due to social deprivation (*psdiawl*), income vulnerability (*pnsdibwl*), income below the income poverty line (*pibmvfb*) and income below the extreme income poverty line (*pibmvfsb*).¹

¹ *pps*: population with at least one social deprivation (within the Social Deprivation Index, namely: educational backwardness, access to health services, access to social security, housing quality and spaces, basic services in housing and access to food) and whose income is insufficient to acquire the goods and services required to satisfy their food and non-food needs; *pmpps*: population that is poor but not in extreme poverty; *pepps*: population with three or more deprivations and that is also below the minimum welfare line; *psdiawl*: population presenting one or more social deprivations, but whose income is above the welfare line; *pnsdibwl*: population that does not present social deprivations but whose income is below or equal to the welfare line; *pibmvfb*: population whose income is below the monetary value of a basic food basket; and, *pibmvfsb*: population with income below the monetary value of a basic food, goods and services basket

The explanatory variable includes paid housework, *phw*, measured in persons of 15 years of age and older as a percentage of the economically active population. The data are obtained from the STPS-INEGI National Occupation and Employment Survey. Likewise, following the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) three dimensions determine the poverty situation of people, that is, income, verifying whether it is located below a certain poverty line, and access to basic services and capabilities, assessing whether it has enough to function in society (UNESCO, 2015). In this sense, variables included are: (i) international remittances, defined as the monetary amount from abroad transferred by an individual to a beneficiary in national territory as a percentage of GDP, *rem*; (ii) federal spending on the “Prospera Social Inclusion Program”, including operating costs, as a percentage of social spending, *prospr*; iii) education, defined as spending on education as a percentage of total spending, *edus*; iv) health, defined as spending on health as a percentage of total spending, *heals*; and, v) value added in the primary sector and value added in the secondary sector, both as a percentage of GDP, *pva* and *sva*, which reflect the effect of productive or structural specialization on poverty.

Coefficients for all variables are expected with a negative sign, indicating that they contribute to the reduction of state poverty. In the case of paid housework, a priori the sign is undefined; however, given the focus of the paper, a positive sign is expected. Finally, it is tested whether the coefficient of paid housework is different between entities, so interactive variables per entity are included, constructed by multiplying each dichotomous variable by the variable *phw*, that is, $dphwit = dit * phwit$.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The hypothesis that paid housework is a generator of poverty is tested using the sys-GMM methodology. Seven different specifications are estimated, each one associated with a poverty indicator. The main results are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The estimation is based on the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model. Since the literature does not have a standard method of analysis, the variables are worked in levels. Also, due linear regression model may be misspecified as a consequence of an incorrect functional form, omitted variables, or heteroscedasticity, its correct specification must be verified. For the seven poverty specifications, the results suggest the

(basic food basket plus non-food basket) (CONEVAL, <https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/Paginas/Glosario.aspx>).

rejection of the null hypothesis that the model has a correct specification (Ramsey Reset Test), so it is necessary to consider a specification that includes individual effects.

In this regard, the Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests are performed. The first test allows evaluating the assumption of individual effects between states. For all cases, the BPLM test indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis (individual specific variance is equal to zero), so that individual effects in the specification are accepted. The second test indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis, suggesting that the best poverty models should consider fixed effects.

Systematically, the different tests find evidence of heteroscedasticity and first order autocorrelation in the model; although they do not show problems of cross-sectional dependence or multicollinearity. Therefore, the sys-GMM dynamic panel data model is followed, which uses as instruments the lags of the endogenous variables, being a two-stage estimator, which corrects the variance and covariance matrix to deal with heteroscedasticity. The introduction of variables such as remittances, education and health expenditures, Prospera program and productive specialization allows controlling endogeneity by including relevant factors in the poverty determination which makes the model robust.

Estimates are made by testing different instruments. The Hansen test, which examines the validity of the joint sys-GMM instruments, did not reject the hypothesis that the instruments are valid in any poverty specification. In addition, the diff-in-Hansen test, which examines subsets of instruments, also fails to reject the hypothesis of instrument exogeneity. Moreover, in all cases the number of instruments included is smaller than the number of cross-sections. Thus, it is concluded that the poverty estimates are efficient. Additionally, the Arellano-Bond test evaluates the existence of serial autocorrelation, which is essential to determine when the instruments are lags. Since the test finds no evidence of first-order autocorrelation, AR(1), or second-order autocorrelation, AR(2), it is accepted that the different poverty models are correctly specified as sys-GMM.

The results in Table 1 show that the statistical significance of the different variables, including paid housework, is systematically maintained, the signs practically do not change and the value of the coefficients remains within the same range.

Table 1: Estimates by OLS, FE, RE and sys-GMM

Variables / Dependent variable	OLS	FE	RE	sys-GMM
<i>psp</i>				
<i>pov_{t-1}</i>	-	-	-	0.712* [0.036]
<i>phw</i>	-0.891* [0.000]	-0.257** [0.053]	-0.875* [0.004]	-0.912** [0.063]
<i>rem</i>	-0.027* [0.012]	-0.077* [0.000]	-0.002 [0.388]	-0.163** [0.071]
<i>prospr</i>	-1.222* [0.000]	-0.102*** [0.172]	0.565 [0.265]	-0.269* [0.042]
<i>edus</i>	-0.074* [0.002]	0.053*** [0.111]	0.027 [0.308]	-0.892* [0.037]
<i>heals</i>	-0.302* [0.000]	-0.170* [0.013]	-0.026 [0.351]	-2.999* [0.034]
<i>pva</i>	0.363* [0.001]	0.140 [0.594]	0.473* [0.014]	0.731* [0.031]
<i>sva</i>	-0.087* [0.000]	-0.138* [0.003]	-0.037 [0.302]	-0.274* [0.043]
<i>Constant</i>	0.058* [0.001]	0.275* [0.000]	0.113* [0.000]	0.399** [0.058]
Observations	192	192	192	160
R ²	0.758	0.291	-	-
Test Reset (Prob > F)	[0.000]	-	-	-
Breusch-Pagan (Prob > Chibar ²)	-	-	[0.000]	-
Hausman (Prob > chi ²)	-	[0.000]**	-	-
Pesaran	-	3.88 [0.000]	-	-
VIF	-	1.4	-	-
Modified DW	-	1.173	-	-
Baltagi-Wu-LBI	-	1.541	-	-
Test Heteroskedasticity (Prob > Chi ²)	-	[0.000]	-	-
AB AR(1)	-	-	-	[0.280]
AB AR(2)	-	-	-	[0.498]
Hansen Test	-	-	-	[0.743]
diff-in-Hansen Test	-	-	-	[0.823]

*, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5% y 1%, respectively. Values in [] correspond to the p-values in the respective tests. *povt-1* represents the corresponding poverty variable with one lag. Time dummies were included in all models.

Source: own elaboration.

Table 1: Continuation

Variables / Dependent variable	OLS	FE	RE	sys-GMM
<i>pspm</i>				
<i>pov_{t-1}</i>	-	-	-	1.071** [0.056]
<i>phw</i>	-0.836* [0.000]	-0.293* [0.002]	-0.699* [0.002]	-0.871* [0.042]
<i>rem</i>	0.037* [0.000]	-0.036* [0.005]	0.004 [0.225]	-0.109*** [0.105]
<i>prospr</i>	0.315* [0.000]	-0.195* [0.002]	0.011 [0.353]	-0.111** [0.063]
<i>edus</i>	-0.06* [0.001]	0.023** [0.099]	0.008 [0.347]	-0.030* [0.008]
<i>heals</i>	0.276* [0.000]	-0.038 [0.503]	0.061 [0.290]	-1.523** [0.069]
<i>pva</i>	0.310* [0.000]	0.237* [0.046]	0.382* [0.010]	2.589* [0.028]
<i>sva</i>	0.045* [0.002]	-0.109* [0.005]	-0.003 [0.217]	-0.150 [0.188]
<i>Constant</i>	0.065* [0.000]	0.205* [0.000]	0.114* [0.000]	0.259* [0.049]
Observations	192	192	192	160
R ²	0.551	0.157	-	-
Test Reset (Prob > F)	[0.000]	-	-	-
Breusch-Pagan (Prob > Chibar ²)	-	-	[0.000]	-
Hausman (Prob > chi ²)	-	[0.000]**	-	-
Pesaran	-	3.786 [0.001]	-	-
VIF	-	1.4	-	-
Modified DW	-	1.254	-	-
Baltagi-Wu-LBI	-	1.655	-	-
Test Heteroskedasticity (Prob > Chi ²)	-	[0.000]	-	-
AB AR(1)	-	-	-	[0.445]
AB AR(2)	-	-	-	[0.773]
Hansen Test	-	-	-	[0.546]
diff-in-Hansen Test	-	-	-	[0.673]

*, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Values in [] correspond to the p-values in the respective tests. *povt-1* represents the corresponding poverty variable with one lag. Time dummies were included in all models.

Source: own elaboration.

Table 1: Continuation

Variables / Dependent variable	OLS	FE	RE	sys-GMM
<i>pspe</i>				
<i>pov_{t-1}</i>	-	-	-	0.126** [0.057]
<i>phw</i>	0.055 [0.244]	-0.039 [0.382]	0.128** [0.080]	1.897* [0.036]
<i>rem</i>	0.009** [0.078]	0.040* [0.000]	-0.009 [0.224]	0.056*** [0.108]
<i>prospr</i>	0.907* [0.000]	0.296* [0.000]	0.558* [0.000]	0.069* [0.042]
<i>edus</i>	-0.014 [0.220]	0.030** [0.072]	0.021 [0.181]	0.318* [0.038]
<i>heals</i>	0.026 [0.297]	-0.132* [0.000]	-0.039*** [0.123]	-0.647** [0.077]
<i>pva</i>	0.054 [0.304]	0.095** [0.070]	0.091 [0.306]	0.409** [0.083]
<i>sva</i>	0.043* [0.000]	-0.031*** [0.106]	0.033* [0.042]	-0.781* [0.026]
<i>Constant</i>	-0.007 [0.385]	0.071* [0.000]	0.003 [0.284]	-0.325 [0.231]
Observations	192	192	192	160
R ²	0.822	0.546	-	-
Test Reset (Prob > F)	[0.000]	-	-	-
Breusch-Pagan (Prob > Chibar ²)	-	-	[0.000]	-
Hausman (Prob > chi ²)	-	[0.000]**	-	-
Pesaran	-	6.286 [0.001]	-	-
VIF	-	1.4	-	-
Modified DW	-	1.616	-	-
Baltagi-Wu-LBI	-	1.919	-	-
Test Heteroskedasticity (Prob > Chi ²)	-	[0.000]	-	-
AB AR(1)	-	-	-	[0.515]
AB AR(2)	-	-	-	[0.631]
Hansen Test	-	-	-	[0.673]
diff-in-Hansen Test	-	-	-	[0.887]

*, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Values in [] correspond to the p-values in the respective tests. *pov_{t-1}* represents the corresponding poverty variable with one lag. Time dummies were included in all models.

Source: own elaboration.

Table 1: Continuation

Variables / Dependent variable	OLS	FE	RE	sys-GMM
<i>pvc</i> s				
<i>pov_{t-1}</i>	-	-	-	0.775*** [0.101]
<i>phw</i>	0.071 [0.349]	0.464** [0.087]	0.305*** [0.137]	1.138* [0.049]
<i>rem</i>	0.011 [0.130]***	0.054* [0.000]	0.021* [0.031]	-0.094* [0.031]
<i>prospr</i>	-0.432* [0.000]	-0.076 [0.300]	-0.287* [0.000]	-0.158* [0.019]
<i>edus</i>	-0.057* [0.000]	-0.009** [0.077]	-0.016* [0.043]	-0.271*** [0.107]
<i>heals</i>	-0.169* [0.001]	-0.096 [0.180]	-0.142* [0.014]	-1.319* [0.043]
<i>pva</i>	0.220* [0.002]	0.054* [0.034]	-0.289 [0.212]	1.706* [0.047]
<i>sva</i>	-0.027* [0.023]	-0.049** [0.083]	-0.020 [0.238]	-0.087 [0.243]
<i>Constant</i>	0.181* [0.000]	0.144* [0.000]	0.195* [0.000]	0.126* [0.038]
Observations	192	192	192	160
R ²	0.453	0.143	-	-
Test Reset (Prob > F)	[0.000]	-	-	-
Breusch-Pagan (Prob > Chibar ²)	-	-	[0.000]	-
Hausman (Prob > chi ²)	-	[0.000]**	-	-
Pesaran	-	6.803 [0.000]	-	-
VIF	-	1.4	-	-
Modified DW	-	1.302	-	-
Baltagi-Wu-LBI	-	1.746	-	-
Test Heteroskedasticity (Prob > Chi ²)	-	[0.008]	-	-
AB AR(1)	-	-	-	[0.374]
AB AR(2)	-	-	-	[0.491]
Hansen Test	-	-	-	[0.512]
diff-in-Hansen Test	-	-	-	[0.478]

*, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Values in [] correspond to the p-values in the respective tests. *povt-1* represents the corresponding poverty variable with one lag. Time dummies were included in all models.

Source: own elaboration.

Table 1: Continuation

Variables / Dependent variable	OLS	FE	RE	sys-GMM
<i>pvi</i>				
<i>pov_{t-1}</i>	-	-	-	0.237* [0.009]
<i>phw</i>	0.245* [0.001]	0.139** [0.128]	-0.014*** [0.116]	2.977** [0.067]
<i>rem</i>	-0.007* [0.043]	-0.001** [0.068]	-0.007** [0.072]	-0.587* [0.039]
<i>prospr</i>	-0.166* [0.000]	-0.039*** [0.137]	-0.080* [0.000]	-1.647** [0.077]
<i>edus</i>	-0.015* [0.029]	-0.023* [0.043]	-0.019* [0.037]	-1.002* [0.046]
<i>heals</i>	0.059* [0.013]	0.088* [0.000]	0.068* [0.002]	-2.409 [0.800]
<i>pva</i>	0.068* [0.033]	0.038*** [0.103]	0.046 [0.196]	2.498* [0.014]
<i>sva</i>	-0.005 [0.329]	0.001 [0.458]	-0.005 [0.290]	-0.111 [0.178]
<i>Constant</i>	0.047* [0.000]	0.025* [0.017]	0.034* [0.000]	0.036* [0.024]
Observations	192	192	192	160
R ²	0.392	0.167	-	-
Test Reset (Prob > F)	[0.000]	-	-	-
Breusch-Pagan (Prob > Chibar ²)	-	-	[0.000]	-
Hausman (Prob > chi ²)	-	[0.041]**	-	-
Pesaran	-	7.134 [0.000]	-	-
VIF	-	1.4	-	-
Modified DW	-	1.681	-	-
Baltagi-Wu-LBI	-	2.073	-	-
Test Heteroskedasticity (Prob > Chi ²)	-	[0.000]	-	-
AB AR(1)	-	-	-	[0.797]
AB AR(2)	-	-	-	[0.795]
Hansen Test	-	-	-	[0.425]
diff-in-Hansen Test	-	-	-	[0.315]

*, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Values in [] correspond to the p-values in the respective tests. *pov_{t-1}* represents the corresponding poverty variable with one lag. Time dummies were included in all models.

Source: own elaboration.

Table 1: Continuation

Variables / Dependent variable	OLS	FE	RE	sys-GMM
<i>piilpei</i>				
<i>pov_{t-1}</i>	-	-	-	0.313* [0.015]
<i>phw</i>	-0.009 [0.256]	0.124** [0.090]	0.214 [0.241]	0.939* [0.048]
<i>rem</i>	0.004*** [0.109]	0.089* [0.000]	0.161*** [0.126]	0.290* [0.013]
<i>prospr</i>	0.985* [0.000]	0.026** [0.073]	0.690 [0.308]	0.750** [0.061]
<i>edus</i>	-0.042* [0.010]	-0.007** [0.072]	-0.010 [0.185]	1.805* [0.010]
<i>heals</i>	0.244* [0.000]	-0.004 [0.247]	-0.200* [0.002]	-2.729** [0.051]
<i>pva</i>	0.233* [0.002]	-0.047 [0.430]	0.313* [0.008]	1.655** [0.059]
<i>sva</i>	0.067* [0.000]	-0.063*** [0.107]	0.063* [0.003]	-0.155** [0.097]
<i>Constant</i>	0.001 [0.472]	0.140* [0.000]	-0.002 [0.328]	0.928 [0.396]
Observations	192	192	192	160
R ²	0.774	0.284	-	-
Test Reset (Prob > F)	[0.000]	-	-	-
Breusch-Pagan (Prob > Chibar ²)	-	-	[0.002]	-
Hausman (Prob > chi ²)	-	[0.000]**	-	-
Pesaran	-	7.010 [0.000]	-	-
VIF	-	1.4	-	-
Modified DW	-	1.267	-	-
Baltagi-Wu-LBI	-	1.627	-	-
Test Heteroskedasticity (Prob > Chi ²)	-	[0.000]	-	-
AB AR(1)	-	-	-	[0.731]
AB AR(2)	-	-	-	[0.733]
Hansen Test	-	-	-	[0.953]
diff-in-Hansen Test	-	-	-	[0.905]

*, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Values in [] correspond to the p-values in the respective tests. *povt-1* represents the corresponding poverty variable with one lag. Time dummies were included in all models.

Source: own elaboration.

Table 1: Continuation

Variables / Dependent variable	OLS	FE	RE	sys-GMM
<i>piilpi</i>				
<i>pov_{t-1}</i>	-	-	-	0.681* [0.039]
<i>phw</i>	-0.648* [0.007]	-0.389*** [0.116]	-0.880* [0.004]	-1.048* [0.022]
<i>rem</i>	-0.021* [0.049]	-0.078* [0.000]	-0.002** [0.089]	-0.029* [0.034]
<i>prospr</i>	-1.056* [0.000]	-0.063** [0.054]	-0.553* [0.000]	-0.317** [0.081]
<i>edus</i>	-0.089* [0.000]	0.030 [0.327]	-0.004** [0.089]	-1.043* [0.049]
<i>heals</i>	0.361* [0.000]	-0.083** [0.083]	-0.124*** [0.118]	-2.394* [0.042]
<i>pva</i>	0.431* [0.000]	0.103* [0.029]	0.531* [0.004]	1.309* [0.036]
<i>sva</i>	-0.082* [0.000]	-0.137* [0.010]	0.045 [0.193]	-0.289* [0.033]
<i>Constant</i>	0.104* [0.000]	0.300* [0.000]	0.135* [0.000]	0.437* [0.039]
Observations	192	192	192	160
R ²	0.721	0.208	-	-
Test Reset (Prob > F)	[0.000]	-	-	-
Breusch-Pagan (Prob > Chibar ²)	-	-	[0.009]	-
Hausman (Prob > chi ²)	-	[0.000]**	-	-
Pesaran	-	7.647 [0.000]	-	-
VIF	-	1.4	-	-
Modified DW	-	1.221	-	-
Baltagi-Wu-LBI	-	1.619	-	-
Test Heteroskedasticity (Prob > Chi ²)	-	[0.000]	-	-
AB AR(1)	-	-	-	[0.383]
AB AR(2)	-	-	-	[0.599]
Hansen Test	-	-	-	[0.735]
diff-in-Hansen Test	-	-	-	[0.810]

*, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5% y 1%, respectively. Values in [] correspond to the p-values in the respective tests. *pov_{t-1}* represents the corresponding poverty variable with one lag. Time dummies were included in all models.

Source: own elaboration.

Table 2: sys-GMM estimates (differentiated slopes)

Variables	<i>psp</i>	<i>pspm</i>	<i>pspe</i>	<i>pvc</i>
<i>pps</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	0.356* [0.039]	-	-	-
<i>pmps</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	- 0.477* [0.001]	-	-	-
<i>peps</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	- - 0.299** [0.052]	-	-	-
<i>psdiawls</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	- - - 0.230*** [0.108]	-	-	-
<i>pnsdibwl</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	- - - -	-	-	-
<i>pibmvfb</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	- - - -	-	-	-
<i>pibmvfsb</i> _{<i>t-1</i>}	- - - -	-	-	-
<i>rem</i>	-0.172** [0.064]	-0.066** [0.091]	0.058** [0.057]	-0.181** [0.053]
<i>prospr</i>	-0.015* [0.043]	-0.047* [0.131]	0.043** [0.093]	-0.281*** [0.112]
<i>edus</i>	-0.293* [0.046]	-0.256* [0.035]	0.042** [0.057]	-0.139 [0.253]
<i>heals</i>	-0.297* [0.045]	-0.190* [0.042]	-0.162*** [0.104]	-0.157** [0.051]
<i>pva</i>	0.718* [0.029]	-0.392*** [0.106]	0.184** [0.091]	1.206** [0.050]
<i>sva</i>	-0.096* [0.041]	-0.034** [0.051]	-0.233** [0.074]	-0.104** [0.076]
<i>constant</i>	0.411* [0.044]	0.578* [0.046]	0.529* [0.059]	0.457* [0.087]
<i>ags</i>	-2.080 [0.199]	-0.933** [0.089]	-0.226** [0.59]	1.875*** [0.092]
<i>bc</i>	-2.972* [0.044]	-1.426* [0.044]	0.542* [0.039]	3.473* [0.048]
<i>bcs</i>	-2.99* [0.036]	-1.427*** [0.102]	0.027** [0.52]	3.544 [0.231]
<i>camp</i>	1.190** [0.071]	0.006 [0.397]	0.018* [0.009]	0.382 [0.435]
<i>cdmx</i>	1.558* [0.042]	1.268* [0.044]	-0.447* [0.027]	-1.270* [0.011]
<i>chih</i>	-4.392** [0.077]	-1.453* [0.027]	0.152** [0.076]	2.392* [0.029]
<i>chis</i>	1.473* [0.041]	0.165** [0.071]	1.513* [0.031]	0.065* [0.046]
<i>coah</i>	0.394 [0.307]	0.030* [0.019]	0.405* [0.043]	-1.169** [0.088]
<i>col</i>	-1.682* [0.047]	-0.551* [0.026]	-0.083 [0.320]	1.930** [0.062]
<i>dgo</i>	-1.094* [0.014]	0.065* [0.014]	0.177** [0.084]	0.858** [0.055]
<i>gro</i>	0.774* [0.021]	-0.621** [0.061]	2.226* [0.043]	2.600* [0.048]
<i>gto</i>	0.643* [0.037]	0.718** [0.064]	-0.083 [0.562]	0.368*** [0.112]
<i>hgo</i>	1.314* [0.040]	0.761* [0.035]	0.218** [0.066]	1.929** [0.065]
<i>jal</i>	-0.859*** [0.091]	-0.100* [0.035]	-0.129* [0.007]	-1.217** [0.068]
<i>mex</i>	0.680* [0.038]	0.762* [0.036]	-0.044** [0.080]	-0.679* [0.044]
<i>mich</i>	1.038* [0.009]	1.118* [0.048]	0.098* [0.031]	-2.751 [0.362]
<i>mor</i>	-0.130* [0.017]	-0.166* [0.049]	0.046* [0.037]	0.417* [0.039]
<i>nay</i>	-1.908 [0.280]	-0.632* [0.036]	0.312* [0.031]	1.594* [0.041]
<i>nl</i>	-1.180* [0.029]	-0.708* [0.005]	-0.471* [0.023]	-0.406* [0.032]
<i>oax</i>	1.662* [0.015]	0.366* [0.028]	1.352* [0.034]	1.121* [0.049]
<i>pue</i>	1.915* [0.044]	1.263* [0.020]	0.282* [0.043]	0.638* [0.045]
<i>qro</i>	-1.233*** [0.105]	-0.588* [0.034]	-0.207* [0.076]	0.808 [0.191]
<i>qroo</i>	-0.703** [0.073]	0.063* [0.019]	0.047* [0.018]	1.785* [0.048]
<i>sin</i>	-1.939* [0.045]	-0.949* [0.041]	-0.085** [0.056]	2.134* [0.046]
<i>slp</i>	-2.495*** [0.103]	-1.692* [0.048]	0.941* [0.048]	2.063* [0.037]
<i>son</i>	-2.152** [0.055]	-1.043* [0.024]	-0.025* [0.062]	-2.063** [0.102]
<i>tab</i>	1.116** [0.027]	0.354* [0.042]	0.104 [0.462]	0.455 [0.500]
<i>tamps</i>	-0.376** [0.083]	-0.132* [0.022]	0.263** [0.091]	0.776* [0.031]
<i>tlax</i>	0.180* [0.043]	0.485* [0.045]	0.146* [0.033]	0.890* [0.044]
<i>ver</i>	1.440** [0.055]	0.766* [0.024]	0.597*** [0.101]	-0.309* [0.027]
<i>yuc</i>	0.269* [0.008]	0.345* [0.012]	0.167 [0.307]	0.787** [0.059]
<i>zac</i>	1.820* [0.007]	1.493*** [0.113]	0.137** [0.079]	-2.224* [0.034]
Observations	160	160	160	160
AB AR(1)	[0.316]	[0.021]	[0.005]	[0.399]
AB AR(2)	[0.899]	[0.484]	[0.327]	[0.642]
Hansen Test	[0.955]	[0.976]	[0.941]	[0.440]
diff-in-Hansen Test	[0.745]	[0.995]	[0.899]	[0.925]

*, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5% y 1%, respectively. Values in [] correspond to the p-values in the respective tests. Time dummies were included in all models.

Source: own elaboration.

Table 2: Continuation

Variables	<i>pvi</i>		<i>piilpei</i>		<i>piilpi</i>	
pps_{t-1}	-	-	-	-	-	-
$pmps_{t-1}$	-	-	-	-	-	-
$peps_{t-1}$	-	-	-	-	-	-
$psdiawls_{t-1}$	-	-	-	-	-	-
$pnsdibwl_{t-1}$	0.028**	[0.097]	-	-	-	-
$pibmyfb_{t-1}$	-	0.423*	[0.024]	-	-	-
$pibmyfsb_{t-1}$	-	-	0.345*	[0.017]	-	-
<i>rem</i>	-0.026**	[0.064]	0.150*	[0.007]	-0.154*	[0.039]
<i>prospr</i>	-0.114*	[0.015]	0.103**	[0.051]	-0.088	[0.212]
<i>edus</i>	-0.084*	[0.045]	0.220**	[0.075]	-0.228**	[0.088]
<i>heals</i>	-0.366**	[0.071]	-0.341**	[0.075]	-0.281*	[0.046]
<i>pva</i>	0.355**	[0.056]	0.407	[0.261]	0.498*	[0.046]
<i>sva</i>	-0.081**	[0.069]	-0.087***	[0.105]	-0.073**	[0.053]
<i>constant</i>	0.212*	[0.101]	0.367	[0.162]	0.340*	[0.038]
<i>ags</i>	0.886***	[0.102]	-1.346**	[0.065]	-1.811***	[0.108]
<i>bc</i>	0.463**	[0.054]	-2.389**	[0.089]	-3.010*	[0.041]
<i>bcs</i>	0.096	[0.338]	1.522*	[0.019]	-2.801*	[0.024]
<i>camp</i>	1.105**	[0.052]	-0.160	[0.364]	0.040**	[0.080]
<i>cdmx</i>	-0.778**	[0.053]	0.622*	[0.034]	1.895*	[0.040]
<i>chih</i>	0.219**	[0.081]	1.556*	[0.017]	-2.612	[0.220]
<i>chis</i>	0.191*	[0.049]	1.970*	[0.050]	1.343*	[0.026]
<i>coah</i>	0.697**	[0.070]	0.014*	[0.008]	0.300**	[0.053]
<i>col</i>	0.062**	[0.055]	0.432*	[0.017]	-1.461*	[0.018]
<i>dgo</i>	0.490*	[0.029]	0.083	[0.555]	-0.909*	[0.029]
<i>gro</i>	0.942*	[0.028]	1.387*	[0.046]	0.901*	[0.022]
<i>gto</i>	0.215**	[0.084]	0.525*	[0.032]	0.184	[0.249]
<i>hgo</i>	0.462**	[0.054]	0.204*	[0.022]	1.404*	[0.036]
<i>jal</i>	-0.203**	[0.062]	-0.262*	[0.037]	-0.749*	[0.007]
<i>mex</i>	-0.485**	[0.064]	0.203*	[0.043]	1.060*	[0.015]
<i>mich</i>	-2.081	[0.170]	0.909**	[0.063]	0.857*	[0.042]
<i>mor</i>	0.340*	[0.021]	-0.374*	[0.048]	0.031*	[0.007]
<i>nay</i>	0.471*	[0.042]	0.435*	[0.040]	-1.595*	[0.037]
<i>nl</i>	-0.323*	[0.035]	-1.011*	[0.038]	-1.155*	[0.049]
<i>oax</i>	0.338*	[0.042]	1.620*	[0.025]	1.739*	[0.026]
<i>pue</i>	0.354*	[0.015]	1.066*	[0.021]	1.951**	[0.055]
<i>qro</i>	0.490*	[0.031]	0.957*	[0.007]	-1.135*	[0.037]
<i>qroo</i>	0.184*	[0.025]	0.434*	[0.034]	-0.197*	[0.044]
<i>sin</i>	0.536*	[0.041]	1.335**	[0.066]	-1.789**	[0.052]
<i>slp</i>	-0.632*	[0.037]	-1.068*	[0.021]	-2.002*	[0.042]
<i>son</i>	-0.328*	[0.027]	-1.183*	[0.047]	-2.040**	[0.064]
<i>tab</i>	0.231	[0.313]	0.134	[0.337]	0.504	[0.237]
<i>tamps</i>	0.628*	[0.038]	0.478**	[0.064]	-0.240**	[0.080]
<i>tlax</i>	0.666*	[0.046]	0.148*	[0.017]	0.471*	[0.022]
<i>ver</i>	0.385*	[0.016]	1.292*	[0.036]	1.321**	[0.095]
<i>yuc</i>	0.143*	[0.018]	0.235*	[0.041]	0.362*	[0.026]
<i>zac</i>	0.445*	[0.039]	1.592	[0.235]	1.686	[0.284]
Observations	160		160		160	
AB AR(1)	[0.116]		[0.025]		[0.269]	
AB AR(2)	[0.369]		[0.978]		[0.845]	
Hansen Test	[0.943]		[0.915]		[0.976]	
diff-in-Hansen Test	[0.999]		[0.975]		[0.901]	

*, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5% y 1%, respectively. Values in [] correspond to the p-values in the respective tests. Time dummies were included in all models.

Source: own elaboration.

Specifically, in the case of the population living in poverty, *pps*, the coefficient of paid housework, *phw*, shows a negative sign and is statistically significant, that is, performing this type of activity reduces, on average, the percentage of people living in poverty in the federative states. Similarly, the rest of the variables tend to reduce the percentage of poor people. The exception is given by *pva*, whose sign is positive, so that specializing in primary activities increases the proportion of people in poverty.

When considering the subsamples of population living in poverty, it is found that, for the population living in moderate poverty, *pmps*, the sign of paid housework is negative and statistically significant at one percent. The other variables show a similar effect, except for GDP in primary activities, so they contribute to reduce the ratio of poor people who have an income below the minimum welfare line or below this threshold but face less than three social deprivations.

With respect to the population living in extreme poverty, *peps*, that with income below the minimum welfare line and with at least three social deprivations, the coefficient of *phw*, is significant at one percent, but changes to positive, so that people in these activities generate a greater proportion of extreme poor. At the same time, remittances, the Prospera program, spending on education and specialization in primary activities favor the increase in extreme poverty. In particular, a perverse effect of social assistance is observed, which reduces the poorest citizens ability to insert themselves into labor markets or even migrate to more productive regions (Martínez *et al.*, 2019). Meanwhile, public spending on health and secondary activities show negative and significant signs.

For people vulnerable due to social deprivation (*psdiawl*), it is observed that the paid housework and a productive structure oriented to the primary sector increase the percentage of people with one or more social deprivation and with income above the welfare line. In contrast, remittances, the Prospera program, spending on education and health, and activities in the secondary sector tend to reduce the percentage of people in this situation.

Considering people who do not present social deprivation but whose income is less than or equal to the welfare line, *pnsdibwl*, coefficients for *phw* and *pva* are estimated with a positive and significant sign. In other words, people involved in household service or in the primary sector of the economy obtain limited remunerations that make them vulnerable in terms of income. International transfers, monetary support from the Prospera Program and a productive structure oriented to the secondary sector contribute directly to income, which is reflected in the negative sign of the

coefficients. Spending on health and education also reduce income vulnerability, although this effect can be expected to be indirect.

In the case of the variables linked to well-being, for the population with income below the income poverty line, *pibmvfsb*, the coefficient of *phw* is significant at one percent with a negative sign. This suggests that remunerated household activities increase family income, bringing it closer to the value of the food and non-food baskets. That is, they contribute to directly reducing poverty.

The positive effect is complemented by remittances from abroad, by employment in secondary activities, by monetary support from the Prospera program and by the effect derived from spending on education and health, all with significant and negative coefficients. These variables tend to reduce income poverty and, therefore, increase population welfare. In this specification, a structural specialization in the primary sector negatively affects welfare levels.

In the case of the population with income below the value of a basic food basket, *pibmvfb*, similar results are observed as in the estimation of poverty measured by *peps*. Thus, paid housework, transfers from abroad, income via Prospera, educational expenses, and primary productive orientation stimulate the percentage of the population living in extreme income poverty. In contrast, health expenditures and economic activities in the industrial sector tend to reduce this type of poverty.

Regarding the effect of the other variables, it is observed that remittances are systematically significant with a negative sign, except for extreme poverty. This is congruent with the results of Mora & Morales (2018) and Mora *et al.* (2018), for whom international remittances reduce poverty rates in the country.

For the Prospera Program, negative and significant signs are estimated in all models except for moderate poverty. Thus, this federal government spending reduces moderate poverty, in line with the findings of Urzúa & Brambila (2009), who argue that the Progres-Oportunidades program has reduced poverty in the country. At the same time, the coefficient of the program is significant and positive in extreme poverty, which is contrary to the evidence of López *et al.* (2018) who establish that the Program represents progress in reducing extreme poverty. In any case, it seems to have contributed to avoid the deepening of poverty, as Scott (2017) points out.

As for education spending, with the exception of the model for income poverty below the extreme poverty line, the estimated coefficient is negative and significant. This means that investment in education has payoffs in

terms of lower poverty. This is consistent with Navarro & Delfín (2017), for whom efficiency in the use of public resources in education has an impact on lower poverty levels in the federative entities.

Health spending at state level is the only variable that always shows statistical significance and a negative sign, being, consequently, the most important factor in combating poverty. This idea is consistent with Khaleghian & Das Gupta (2005) who argue that health spending plays a central role in improving the situation of the poor.

Likewise, Wagstaff (2002) points out that poor health keeps the people in poverty, that is why investment in health improves their conditions, helping them to get out of this situation. In this regard, Khaleghian & Das Gupta (2005) add that the returns to health spending are higher in low-income economies, which shows its importance in the case of the poorest entities. Also, the favorable effect on poverty reduction suggests an equity character in public health policies favoring more the poor.

In addition, there are interesting results in terms of paid housework. It has a relevant role in reducing the percentage of people in poverty, in moderate poverty, and with income below the poverty line. This is aligned with the results of Bensúsán (2019), for whom the situation of houseworkers is associated with a lower level of poverty and vulnerabilities. One possible explanation is that housework allows the working person to obtain either an income of a magnitude above the minimum welfare line, or below this threshold, but enough to face less than three social deprivations. Alternatively, it may mean an income above the income poverty line.

This contributes to the idea that the paid housework market generates a viable income source option such that the houseworker is able to acquire goods and services related to food and non-food needs, while covering at least some social needs related to access to education, health services, social security, basic housing and food services, among others.

This result is consistent with the argument of the ILO (2011) on the positive effect of paid housework in reducing poverty via the decrease in unemployment. It is, therefore, a gateway to the labor market and to sources of income, albeit at a low level, that allow different social needs to be addressed, which is also in line with Valenzuela (2009). It is also a mechanism of access to work for higher income and autonomy for the working person (Offenhenden, 2017). Given the low remunerations perceived in this labor market, and in light of these results, this income may represent a complement to family revenue that favors escaping poverty situations.

In any case, the magnitude of the coefficients associated with paid housework is relatively low (compared to phw coefficients with a positive sign), which reflects a limited contribution in combating poverty. In particular, the reduction in unemployment derived from paid housework would arise, as Offenhenden (2017) points out, under unsuitable working conditions.

On the contrary, since the coefficient associated with phw is significant and positive for the indicators of extreme poverty, vulnerability due to social deprivation, vulnerability due to income and income below the extreme income poverty line, working in the housework sector tends to increase the percentage of people in different situations of extreme poverty and vulnerability.

This suggests that while paid housework offers employment and income opportunities —relatively high— for some people, simultaneously reduces income options for others, probably the poorest. Consequently, a segmented labor market is in sight. On the one hand, a market with better working conditions and remunerations —associated to the minimum wage— to which moderately poor people have access. On the other hand, a market with lower and intermittent income, as well as more precarious working conditions, which increases the risk of falling or remaining in poverty. Even more, following Rodríguez (2016), when people face poverty conditions they are employed in low-paying jobs, and probably access the most precarious segment of the housework market. Workers within the precarious segment face a labor and income situation notably linked to informality and eventuality, which leads them to extreme poverty.

The idea of a labor market divided into segments of low and very low remuneration is based on the payment of minimum wages as a factor that allows addressing social conditions and reducing poverty rates (ILO, 2010). In this regard, workers in the segment with better conditions receive remunerations at least equivalent to the minimum wage, while those in the most precarious segment are not guaranteed the payment of minimum wages, obtaining non-dignified remunerations. The idea of labor market segmentation is discussed at length by Fernández (2010).

As high wages and the creation of formal salaried employment are necessary components for poverty reduction (ILO, 2020), the conditions of paid housework in the high segment tend to contain poverty, while conditions in the low segment tend to perpetuate it. In any case, for the CO-NEVAL (2020), the current minimum wage would have to increase a little more than four times for a family of four to escape income poverty.

On the other hand, it is of value to determine whether the phw coefficients are different among federative entities. Therefore, the poverty models are re-estimated by including interactive variables disaggregated by state for this variable. The results are shown in Table 2. In general, the signs, significances and magnitudes of all coefficients are maintained across specifications. That is, remittances, Prospera monetary support, education and health expenditures, and productive specialization in industrial activities tend to reduce poverty, moderate poverty, but increase extreme poverty.

In particular, the coefficients of the interactive variables tend to be significant in all seven specifications, except for a small number of cases.² It can be seen that the effect is differentiated between states and depends on the poverty indicator used, confirming the findings for the pooled estimation.

The pattern of the positive effect of the thr on poverty reduction is maintained for aggregate poverty, moderate poverty and income below the poverty line, and of the negative effect on the reduction in extreme poverty, due to social deprivation and income vulnerabilities and income below the extreme poverty line.

Considering all the specifications, four groups of entities are identified. The first group, paid housework, regardless of the poverty indicator, represents a poverty-generating mechanism; Chiapas, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Puebla and Tlaxcala appear, which coincide with the entities with the highest percentage of population living in poverty. This is in line with the idea of low income perceived for houseworkers (OAS, 2011).

The second group is the opposite extreme, given that housework represents an income alternative to combat poverty, and includes three states (Jalisco, Nuevo León and Sonora), characterized by their level of industrialization and relatively high per capita income. From this approach, the idea of segmentation of the paid housework market is proven. That is, territorially, the high segment of this market corresponds to group two and the most precarious segment to group one.

The third group includes Mexico City and Mexico, where paid housework contributes to reduce extreme poverty and poverty due to vulnerabilities, but to increasing total poverty, moderate poverty and poverty due to income below the moderate and extreme poverty line. This result suggests that as more people enter paid housework, the higher the percentage of people moving out of extreme and vulnerability-based poverty, but also

² Tabasco shows five non-significant coefficients of paid housework; Campeche three; Baja California Sur, Guanajuato and Michoacán two; Aguascalientes, Colima, Nayarit, Querétaro, Yucatán and Zacatecas one.

the higher the percentage of people in moderate poverty. In other words, there seems to be an inverted U-type behavior in terms of poverty. The last group incorporates the rest of the entities without a defined systematic effect of housework on poverty.

In any case, there is a clear pattern for most entities in which paid housework increases extreme poverty, due to social vulnerabilities and income deprivation, and income below the extreme poverty line. In this regard, the ILO (2010) states that paid housework is very poorly paid, unprotected and poorly regulated, contributing to explain the increase in extreme poverty. Vulnerability due to social deprivation can be explained, as Pedrero (2011) points out, by the lacks of social security, formal contracts, inspection by the labor authorities, etc. Likewise, this finding is consistent with CONEVAL (2018), for whom paid houseworkers represent one of the most vulnerable and unprotected groups of the employed population with few opportunities to access decent work.

The situation becomes more complex when it is recognized that the phenomenon of paid housework is rooted in poverty itself, but also in sociocultural aspects that are difficult to modify and, therefore, make it an obstacle to escaping poverty. One consequence of the segmentation of paid housework is that it generates unequal income among houseworkers and between entities, leading to disparities in access to social dimensions such as health services, social security, public services for housing, food, education, among others. In this sense, the lack or weakness of public policies on housework and labor market regulation are factors in the reproduction and perpetuation of poverty (OAS, 2011).

Finally, to check the robustness of the analysis, the models were re-estimated excluding the control variables. The results are shown in Table 3. Overall, the evidence from the dynamic poverty models suggests robustness in the results. The sys-GMM estimates are significant for all seven poverty indicators, consistent with previous results.³ In short, the effect of paid housework is statistically significant, contributing to reduce aggregate and moderate poverty as well as by income poverty below the moderate poverty line, but tends to increase extreme poverty, by vulnerability of deprivation and income, and by income below the extreme poverty line.

³ The tests for verification of the specifications indicate the non-existence of first- and second-order serial autocorrelation, which implies the validity of the instruments. Also, the Hansen test did not reject the null hypothesis of joint validity of the GMM instruments, while the diff-in-Hansen test also did not reject the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments. In addition, the number of instruments is smaller than the number of groups.

Table 3. sys-GMM estimates (without control variables)

Variables / dependent Variable	pps	pmps	pps	psdiaw1	pnsdibw1	pibmvfb	pibmvfsb
<i>phw</i>	-1.272** [0.059]	-0.672* [0.044]	2.535* [0.043]	0.728** [0.071]	3.732** [0.071]	2.299** [0.079]	-1.118** [0.051]
<i>rem</i>	-0.170** [0.062]	-0.122* [0.034]	0.070** [0.061]	-0.144** [0.082]	0.441** [0.058]	0.358** [0.079]	-0.133** [0.088]
<i>prospr</i>	-0.252** [0.085]	-0.324** [0.057]	0.017* [0.049]	-0.576* [0.051]	-2.863** [0.051]	1.134** [0.069]	-0.457* [0.049]
<i>edus</i>	-1.893** [0.042]	-0.840 [0.180]	0.355** [0.068]	-0.482** [0.077]	-0.799* [0.042]	2.094** [0.068]	-1.982** [0.064]
<i>heals</i>	-2.741* [0.038]	-0.041** [0.077]	-0.827** [0.065]	-0.422** [0.069]	-4.030** [0.055]	-2.977** [0.069]	-1.637** [0.093]
<i>pva</i>	1.845* [0.034]	3.763 [0.111]	-0.202** [0.094]	2.853*** [0.102]	4.084** [0.057]	2.841* [0.042]	2.015* [0.022]
<i>sva</i>	-0.661* [0.037]	-0.373* [0.039]	-0.843* [0.047]	-0.383** [0.094]	-0.075*** [0.117]	-0.258* [0.048]	-0.689* [0.024]
<i>Constant</i>	0.618 [0.285]	0.323* [0.038]	-0.370** [0.082]	0.083 [0.171]	0.252** [0.057]	1.065** [0.067]	0.728** [0.072]
Observations	160	160	160	160	160	160	160
AB AR(1)	[0.656]	[0.472]	[0.441]	[0.675]	[0.417]	[0.694]	[0.766]
AB AR(2)	[0.587]	[0.817]	[0.651]	[0.657]	[0.451]	[0.695]	[0.670]
Hansen Test	[0.942]	[0.949]	[0.967]	[0.512]	[0.654]	[0.982]	[0.923]
diff-in-Hansen Test	[0.763]	[0.746]	[0.820]	[0.352]	[0.360]	[0.926]	[0.689]

*, **, and *** significant at 10%, 5% y 1%, respectively. Values in [] correspond to the p-values in the respective tests. povt-1 represents the corresponding poverty variable with one lag. Time dummies were included in all models.

Source: own elaboration.

CONCLUSIONS

The paper provides evidence at the federative entities level of the effect of paid housework on poverty, measured by seven different indicators calculated by the CONEVAL, for the period 2008-2018. It employs a sys-GMM methodology that is considered to report robust results.

Paid housework is an employment option for people, mainly women, from poor sectors. However, the evidence in this document tends to confirm that housework constitutes a link in the reproduction of poverty (ECLAC,

2009). Thus, the hypothesis of paid housework as a generator of poverty, particularly of an extreme nature and due to vulnerabilities, is accepted.

In short, the evidence suggests the idea of a segmented paid housework market. A segment with better working conditions and income, close to the minimum wage, in which moderately poor people participate, and a market fraction with more precarious income and working conditions, to which the payment of a minimum wage is not guaranteed, and which increases the risk of falling or remaining in poverty.

Likewise, the evidence at the state level suggests a differentiated effect of paid housework, depending on the poverty indicator, but with a pattern similar to the pooled estimates. In any case, it is observed that for most states this type of work increases extreme poverty, by vulnerability to social and income deprivation, and by income below the extreme poverty line, although it contributes to reducing aggregate and moderate poverty.

The idea of segmentation of the paid housework market at the territorial level is verified by identifying four groups of entities according to the phw effect. In the first group, paid housework is a poverty-generating mechanism (Chiapas, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Puebla and Tlaxcala); in the second group, it represents an income alternative to combat poverty (Jalisco, Nuevo León and Sonora); in the third group, contributes to reducing extreme poverty and poverty due to vulnerabilities, but to increasing total, moderate and income poverty below the moderate and extreme poverty line (Mexico City and Mexico); in the last (the remaining entities) there is no systematic effect of housework, but in general, it reduces moderate poverty and increases extreme poverty.

In addition, given that the market for paid housework includes demand from middle- and high-income sectors and supply from low- and very low-income people with few labor alternatives, the equilibrium implies a private solution to a social problem (Cox, 2006), characterized by hiring under generally precarious conditions, given the incipient government regulation.

Therefore, for housework to become a poverty-reducing vehicle as an alternative to address unemployment and represent decent work, households must be willing and able to pay minimum wages (ILO, 2010). For Howell (2014), it is essential that employers help houseworkers to escape and avoid the cycle of poverty and thus avoid the intergenerational and territorial reproduction of poverty.

Given the invisibility of paid housework, since it is performed within private households and not in public spaces or companies, achieving the

above requires structural reforms from the government, which encourage positive actions by the employer and substantially modify the unfavorable situation of groups such as paid houseworkers. Incentives can be aimed at increasing the level of schooling and job training of these workers, improving working conditions and promoting human rights (Valenzuela, 2009). Alternatively, conditional transfer programs are needed to supplement the income of houseworkers, especially those living in extreme poverty.

It is recognized that the main limitation of this document is associated with the lack of data directly obtained from houseworkers. In this sense, there is a need for surveys to obtain information from primary sources related to the market valuation of present income, the availability of time for working, and of the future social security needs of houseworkers and their families. Also, in general terms, the study assumes that houseworkers entering this labor market are available to work full time, but does not consider that in social reality they face double or triple workloads. Therefore, a possible line of research includes the availability of time use, mainly of women, given the potential trade-off between income and time.

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